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ABSTRACT
To what extent are firms kept out of a market by patents covering related technologies? Do patents
held by potential entrants make it easier to enter markets? We estimate the empirical relationship
between market entry and patents for 27 narrowly defined categories of software products during 
the period 1990-2004. Controlling for demand, market characteristics, average patent quality, and
other factors, we find that a 10% increase in the number of patents relevant to market reduces the  
rate of entryby 3-8%, and this relationship intensified following explanations in the patentability 
of software in the mid-1990s. However, potential entrants with patent applications relevant to a 
market are more likely to enter it.  Finally patents appear to substitute for comlimentary assets in 
the entry process, as patents have both greater entry-deterring and entry-promoting effects for firms
















Patents can be a significant barrier to entry into markets for many products.  The patent holder 
has the exclusive right to make, use or sell the claimed invention, and the costs for entrants to invent 
around, license, or fight legal disputes relating to a patent can be substantial.  However, evidence on the 
role of patents in shaping incumbent/entrant competition is mixed.  Some case studies such as GE in 
electric lamps (Bright 1949), Pilkington’s float glass process (Yao 1997) or Xerox in the late 1970s 
(Bresnahan 1985) have identified patents as a powerful mechanism for protecting innovators from 
competition.  However, the experience of other industries such as the “diaper wars” of the 1970s and 80s, 
or coronary stents in the 1990s, shows that even where a pioneer firm has patent protection for its product, 
competitors can rapidly enter the market with very similar products and win significant share.  More 
broadly, survey research reporting the experience of practicing managers has shown that the power of 
patents to block imitation by competitors is generally perceived as imperfect, and is surprisingly weak in 
many industries (Mansfield et al. (1981), Levin et al. (1987), Cohen et al. (2000)).   
Many firms nonetheless acquire large portfolios of patents, and even where the primary 
motivation for doing this goes beyond the potential to exclude competitors, the impact of an accumulated 
patent “thicket” on entry costs may be substantial.  In this paper we examine the effect of patent holdings 
in a set of narrowly defined software markets on rates of entry into those markets, and find a significant 
negative effect.  Even after controlling for factors affecting entry such as demand, market structure, and 
technological opportunity, any association between patents and entry is, of course, difficult to interpret 
causally.  In particular, incumbents’ decisions to acquire patents may be endogenous to the threat of entry.  
In this context, however, we are able to take advantage of a series of important changes in the legal 
regime governing software patents that clarified patentability of different types of software inventions, 
and resolved uncertainty about the enforceability of issued patents.  These shocks to the strength of 
patents in different markets let us use an approach inspired by the “differences-in-differences” 
methodology to identify the increase in the deterrent effect of patents that took place with the expansion 
of software patentability.  
Our estimation results suggest an economically substantial effect: holding constant the quality of 
issued patents and other market characteristics, a 1% increase in the number of patents is associated with 
a 0.8% decline in the number of entrants into a market, and in firm-level models this effect is between 
-0.3% and -0.8%.  The negative impact of patent thickets appears to be particularly strong for de novo 
entrants and firms without experience in other software markets.  But, importantly, these negative effects 
on entry are mitigated when entrants come to market with their own patents: firms that have filed 
applications for patents relevant to a market are approximately twice as likely to enter as otherwise 
similar firms. 
While much of the literature has focused on patents as an indicator of innovation success, 
technological opportunity, or innovative capabilities, finding a positive correlation between firms’ patent   3
holdings and entry, these findings re-emphasize the role of patents as barriers to entry.  They also suggest 
a powerful motivation for potential entrants to invest scarce resources to obtain their own patents, and 
point to an increasingly important strategic role for patents in this industry.  As all industry participants 
have responded to increased incentives to obtain patents, the “thicket” in these markets has grown 
dramatically, imposing greater and greater transactions costs on all firms.  This suggests an enhanced role 
for strategic use of collaborative arrangements such as patent pooling and cross-licensing that can reduce 
the negative effects of thickets, opportunities to realize profits through creating organizations that can 
internalize such costs, and performance penalties for firms that fail to develop capabilities for responding 
to these challenges.   
Literature Review  
The empirical literature on entry has focused on the roles of four main factors in influencing 
entry: demand, competition, technological capabilities, and entry costs.
1  Our focus here is on the latter:  
whether differences across software markets in the extent of patenting are associated with differences in 
rates of entry.  The classic view of the role of patents in incumbent/entrant competition can be found in 
Porter (1980), who postulates the importance of patents as a barrier to entry and source of competitive 
advantage for incumbents but does not quantify this effect.  Large scale statistical studies of PIMS or 
COMPUSTAT data have found patents to be associated with higher market shares (Robinson 1988) or 
market/book ratios (Cockburn and Griliches (1988), Hall (1993)), but it has proven difficult to distinguish 
the pure property right/exclusion aspect of patents from their role as indicators of innovative success.   
Research in the strategy literature seeking to understand the entry process has largely focused on 
patents as indicators of entrants’ technological capabilities, knowledge assets, or innovation success, 
rather than as barriers to entry.  Helfat and Lieberman (2002), for example, emphasize the importance of 
matching firm’s pre-entry resources and capabilities to the requirements of the target market, with 
diversifying entrants seeking economies of scope by matching their pre-entry resources and capabilities 
with the “required resource profile of the industry”.  Silverman (1999) explains corporate diversification 
as a function of firms’ technological resources, which are measured using patents mapped to four-digit 
SIC codes.  In a similar vein, de Figueiredo and Kyle (2001) find that laser printer firms with more 
patents are more likely to enter new markets, Nerkar and Roberts (2004) use patents to provide 
information on a firm’s technological resources in modeling the success of new product introductions in 
pharmaceuticals, and Henderson and Cockburn (1994) and Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern (2004) use 
patents to measure accumulated knowledge capital and technological capabilities in pharmaceutical firms.  
                                                      
1 Cross-industry comparisons of entry rates have yielded several interesting findings (see Geroski (1995) for a 
discussion).  Dunne et al. (1998) contains estimates of entry rates averaging between 41.4% and 51.8% over five-
year census periods for a panel of US industries between 1963 and 1982.  Within-industry variation in entry rates 
appears to dominate between-industry variation (Geroski (1995), p.423.)   4
Patents play a more significant “property rights” role in the models of Teece (1986), and Gans 
and Stern (2003), who emphasize the critical role of access to co-specialized assets which are 
complementary to IP when entering new markets.  Related work such as Gans, Hsu, Stern (2002) and 
Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2001) generally characterize patents as facilitating transactions in 
technology as an alternative to entry by innovators.
2 
The traditional view of patents as a stimulus to innovation has been complicated in recent years 
by concerns over the extent to which the increasing strategic use of patents, and the general strengthening 
and expansion of patent rights may be stifling innovation.
3  The public policy debate on patents has been 
loudest in industries such as semiconductors, electronics, and software that are characterized by complex 
and cumulative innovation, and where the nature of technology and the fragmentation of patent rights 
pose unusually difficult challenges.  In such circumstances, research suggests that patents are primarily 
used for strategic purposes, such as for use in cross-licensing negotiations or to deter litigation, rather than 
directly for preventing imitation (Cohen et al., 2000).  Hall and Ziedonis (2001) highlight the dramatic 
increase in the strategic use of patents in the semiconductor industry as a response to a pro-patent shift in 
the U.S. policy in the 1980s.  Ziedonis (2004) shows that semiconductor firms patent more aggressively 
when upstream property rights faced by the firm are held by a larger number of other firms.   
In software, some observers have argued that increased use of patents may lead to greater 
innovation and competition in software (see, for example, Smith and Mann (2004)).  This may happen 
through familiar mechanisms such as the incentive effect of increased appropriability of returns from 
R&D.  Increased disclosure of useful information in patent documents may also result in greater industry-
wide R&D productivity compared to a trade secret regime. More subtle mechanisms include the role of 
patents as a signal of the quality of start-up firms to outside investors or in facilitating contracting with 
venture capital or other sources of finance (Mann (2005), Hsu and Ziedonis (2008)).  Patents may permit 
more efficient transactions in knowledge in a market with explicit property rights.  Mann (2005), for 
example, argues that patents benefit firms that are able to use them in cross-licensing negotiations.
4 
Lerner and Zhu (2007) find that the increased use of patents by software firms following the Lotus v. 
Borland decision was associated with improvements in firm performance (as measured, for example, by 
the growth of sales).  Wagner and Cockburn (2010) show that internet companies filing patents were 
more likely to survive the collapse of the dot-com bubble after 2001, and Merges (2006) finds evidence 
                                                      
2  Giarratana (2004) provides a detailed case study of entry and competition in encryption software, including the 
role of patents in facilitating trade in technology. 
3  Federal Trade Commission (2003), Bessen and Meurer (2008), Jaffe and Lerner (2004), and Merrill et al. (2004). 
4  Licensing or purchase of new firms' technology, or outright acquisition of entrants, is one option for incumbents 
threatened by entry, and is likely to be an important channel by which some innovations reach the market.  
Unfortunately we have found no way to measure this activity consistently and accurately in this population of firms, 
and our analysis here is confined to observations on entry.   5
that firms have adjusted to the presence of patents, and that effort put into acquiring patents correlates 
with indicators of market success.   
Conversely, Bessen and Hunt (2007) show that software patents are negatively correlated with 
R&D intensity at the firm level.  Hall and MacGarvie (2010) find that legal decisions expanding software 
patentability were viewed negatively by the stock market and that the marginal software patent makes 
little contribution to market value. In a study closely related to the current paper, Cockburn and 
MacGarvie (2009) find that software start-ups operating in markets with more patents saw their initial 
round of funding delayed relative to firms in less thicketed markets.  Note that few of these studies 
suggest an absolute decline in innovation.  Instead, they suggest that the costs associated with patenting 
may be reducing innovation below potential.   
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our analysis combines data on market conditions, firm characteristics, and entry with data on the 
“patent landscape” relevant to a market.  We measure entry using data on firms’ activity in various 
categories of software reported in an extract of the CorpTech directory of technology companies.  This 
database provides information on 19,306 companies developing or selling software products in the United 
States between 1990 and 2004,
5 and contains detailed information on the product categories in which each 
firm is active, as well as information on the founding date of the firm, revenues and employment for many 
(but not all) of the firms in the dataset, information on corporate parents, funding sources, and a number 
of other variables.  We have matched these firms to other datasets such as SDC to verify and supplement 
the CorpTech data, as well as to the NBER patent database for information on their patent applications 
and grants. 
For the purposes of this study, markets are defined in terms of the “SOF” code used by CorpTech 
to categorize software products.  SOF codes are a hierarchical classification system used by CorpTech to 
group products for market research purposes.  Firms surveyed by CorpTech self-report the SOF codes in 
which they are active, which can include products under development as well as products already 
launched.  By tracking when firms are first listed as being active in a SOF code, we are able to identify 
entrants and incumbents in each market.  Specifically, we classify a firm as an entrant if the firm has 
products in a SOF category after two consecutive sample years (4 years elapsed time) of not having 
products in that class, or is founded less than two years before its first appearance in the dataset.
6  
                                                      
5  The companies in our sample consist of organizations listed by CorpTech as having at least one product 
classification beginning with “SOF”, which is CorpTech’s code for software. Many of these firms are also active in 
other, non-software markets. Approximately 80% of the observations for which we have information on the primary 
SIC code are classified in SIC 73 (prepackaged software). We thank LECG Inc. for facilitating access to these data. 
6  Note that CorpTech reports data biannually, with six sample years in the period 1994-2004. We exclude as 
entrants firms that left the market and then re-entered.  Some firms enter CorpTech several years after their founding 
dates, and we thus do not observe their entry. However, only a relatively small number of these firms actually enter 
during the period under consideration (1994-2002). We omit SOF codes in which the number of missed entries   6
While CorpTech defines more than 290 fine-grained SOF categories, we focus our analysis on a 
subset of 27 of these markets that make up the “core” of the database.  These markets cover a large share 
of the software industry: 35% of all the firms in the CorpTech file are active in at least one of these 
markets. Many of the SOF categories refer to fairly general categories of software or appear to be defined 
in terms of customer segments rather than in terms of a technology—e.g. “secondary school software,” 
“dental practice management software,” etc.—or have very low and intermittent levels of activity.
7  
Furthermore, our analysis also requires a comprehensive mapping of patents to markets, which is a 
challenging and resource-intensive task.  These 27 markets were chosen primarily on the basis of our 
assessment as to whether the technology/product is reasonably distinctive, and we could define a set of 
keywords that could be fruitfully searched in the abstract of patent documents.  Clearly there is some 
potential for selection bias to influence our results, however we believe that the criteria used to choose 
these markets are independent of entry and exit dynamics and this subset does not appear to be markedly 
different in terms of firm characteristics and entry and exit rates (see the Appendix).  However, since 
these markets are selected on the basis of having sufficiently large numbers of patents and sufficiently 
distinctive keywords, our findings may not be generalizable to markets in which there are very few 
patents, or in which inventions are disclosed in unusually general or heterogeneous language.
8 
The markets that we consider are listed in Table 1, along with means of the number of market 
participants and entrants.  As can be seen in the Table, markets vary widely in size, as measured by the 
average number of participants over the sample period, and in the volume of entry.  The average market 
had 156.42 active firms, of which 9.7% were entrants, but these mean values conceal very substantial 
underlying variation over time and across markets.
9  The smallest market averaged 12.5 firms, while the 
largest had 588.  Overall, there was substantial growth in the number of active firms in this sample: 
average market size almost tripled over time, rising from 74.4 firms in 1994 to 201.9 in 2004.  There was 
substantial variation in the mean annual growth rate of individual markets, ranging from 3% per year to 
over 70%.  While the average number of entrants per market per year rose substantially over the sample 
period, the ratio of entrants to market participants varies widely across markets, between 0 and 60% in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
during the period is more than one standard deviation above the mean. The average number of missed entries across 
the categories (calculated as the share of firms that are founded after 1990 but do not appear in the sample until more 
than 2 years after their founding date) amounts to 12.5% of entries, and the standard deviation is 10.08. 
7 While it is possible that the effective definition of markets may have changed somewhat over time, affecting 
counts of market participants, for variation in market definitions to bias our findings any over- or under-inclusion of 
firms in markets would have to be systematically correlated with our measures of patent thickets. We also control 
for this possibility in Table 6, which shows that including market X time effects, as controls for any market-level 
unobserved heterogeneity that changes over time does not affect the results.  
8  Our measurement of entry is therefore contingent on Corptech’s definition of markets.  Industry boundaries may 
be fluid, particularly in rapidly changing technologies, and we may therefore be mis-measuring entry.  
9 Table A.1 in the Appendix shows annual counts of the number of entrants and number of participants in each 
market.   7
some market-years, and fluctuated over time, falling from an average across markets of 19.2% in 1996 to 
3.3% in 2002 and then back up to 8.7% in 2004. 
We measure the “patent landscape,” i.e. the number, characteristics, and ownership of patents 
relevant to each market at a given point in time, by developing a mapping between patents and markets 
that matches USPTO patent classifications to the CorpTech SOF categories.  This was a complex  
process, described in detail in the Appendix: in short, we used a combination of text searching and 
reading the manual of patent classification to identify the set of patent classification codes associated with 
each market, and then collected information on all patents granted in these classes since 1976 from the 
NBER database of US patents.  After extensive hand-checking (see the appendix) we believe that we 
capture most, though not all, patents relevant to each market, whether assigned to competitors or non-
competitors.
10  Based on grant dates and expiration dates of each patent we compute the set of patents “in 
force” that are relevant to a market in a given sample year.  The number of patents falling in this set 
(though not necessarily relevant to a specific product) is one measure of the size of the patent thicket 
faced by an entrant.  As a proxy for bargaining costs associated with patents, we count the number of 
distinct assignees on the set of patents cited by those patents we have identified as relevant to each 
market.  These measures are depicted in Table 1 (and in greater detail Appendix Table A.2).  The number 
of patents per market averaged 2383.5 over all markets and all sample years, but with significant variation 
across markets and over time.  The least patented market had an average of 16.67 patents in force over the 
sample period, while the most patented market averaged more than 7400.  Significantly for the issues of 
interest here, the number of patents in each market grew very rapidly over time for all markets, with mean 
annual growth rates over the period 1993-2004 ranging from 7.9% to 52% (with a mean annual growth 
rate of 22%).   
The average number of cited assignees per market averages 607 with a high of 2738, and a low of 
6.  Clearly, the average potential entrant is very unlikely to have to obtain licenses to 2383 patents from 
607 different entities—only a small fraction of the total number of patents that we have identified as 
being relevant to a market will be applicable to a specific product.  But these figures are consistent with 
anecdotal evidence that in complex technologies, clearing a product for launch can entail reviewing 
thousands of patents.
11  As with the number of patents relevant to each market, this measure grew 
significantly over time in all markets: an entrant to the average market in 2004 would face almost six 
times as many potential licensors as in 1994.  
                                                      
10 Note that this approach does not identify other potentially relevant patents which are generally applicable to many 
different software products, or are otherwise usable outside their “industry of origin,” facilitated by modular design 
of software and use of object-oriented programming techniques.  But provided these “missing” patents are equally 
relevant to all 27 SOF categories this will not affect our ability to identify the effect of patents on entry from the 
cross-section. 
11 Based on conversations with various corporate patent counsel.   8
We hypothesize that entry costs are increasing in the number of patents faced by an entrant.  
These costs include the total amount of royalties that would be have to be paid by an entrant if it licensed 
its way in to the market, R&D expenditures related to inventing around, and a higher probability of 
having to pay infringement damages.  Large numbers of patents also raise costs of performing complete 
searches of prior art, and increase uncertainty about being sued for patent infringement.  While they do 
not account for other determinants of entry into a market controlled for in subsequent regressions, the 
summary statistics in Table 2 suggest a significant negative relationship between patent thickets and 
entry.  For each market-year observation, the number of patents per incumbent is calculated and the 
terciles of the distribution of patents per incumbent in each year are computed. We then calculate the 
mean number of entrants into market-years falling in each tercile, which falls from around 27 entrants in 
the least “thicketed” markets to around 7 entrants in the most thicketed.  However, because this may 
reflect market-specific characteristics unrelated to patenting, we also look at the mean within-market 
change in the number of entrants over each two year period between sample years. Again, we see that 
markets with the fewest patents per incumbent saw the fastest growth in entry, while those with the most 
patents per incumbent saw the smallest increase in entry.  Finally, we compare the average change in the 
number of entrants over the two year period prior to a shift in the legal regime governing software patents 
to that seen in the two years following a regime change.  (As discussed below, these regime shifts 
strengthened patentability at different points in time for different types of software, and provide an 
identifying source of exogenous variation.)  We find that the negative relationship between growth in the 
number of entrants and patenting rates is most evident following the regime shifts. 
Identification 
  Uncovering the impact of patent thickets on entry with conventional data is difficult for several 
reasons.  One central difficulty stems from the fact that a patent reflects not just a property right over an 
invention but also the successful outcome of an R&D investment: because technological innovation 
resulting in a new product is closely related to entry, in equilibrium the raw cross-sectional correlation 
between the number of patents in the market and the entry rate is likely to be positive.  A key challenge in 
empirically identifying the effects of a proliferation of property rights over a given amount of invention, 
therefore, is to find a way to hold the invention constant but allow the property rights to vary.  
We approach this problem as follows.  First, we control for persistent differences across markets 
in the rate of technological innovation (as well as any other time-invariant factors associated with both 
patenting and entry) using market fixed effects.  Our estimates of the effect of patenting on entry are thus 
derived from the “within” relationship between changes in patenting and changes in entry over time.  To 
also control for unobserved heterogeneity across markets that evolves over time, we estimate 
specifications with market fixed effects interacted with a linear or quadratic time trend.  Second, we 
disentangle the effects of patents from the technological capabilities of firms in the market by   9
distinguishing between the total number of patents relevant to a given market and the average quality of 
those patents. We measure the average quality of patents in a market using the mean number of citations 
received by those patents, which is commonly interpreted as an indicator of patent value or importance.
12  
This allows us to isolate the effects of a change in the extent of patenting in a market, holding constant the 
underlying technological significance or economic value of the innovations covered by those patents.   
A second problem with identifying the effect of patents on entry is the potential endogeneity of 
patent filings.  Clearly, it may be difficult to give a causal interpretation to the coefficients of a reduced-
form regression of entry on patents if the volume of patents reflects an equilibrium response by 
incumbents reacting to the threat of entry.  However there are some institutional aspects of the software 
industry that suggest that the impact of this potential source of bias is likely to be limited.  On the one 
hand, a significant share of the patents in each market during this period is held by firms other than 
incumbents, primarily large hardware firms.
13  On the other hand, the time it takes for a patent application 
to make its way through the patent office is very long relative to product development cycles in software.  
The average pendency period for patents relating to the markets in our sample during the time frame 
considered here was 2.8 years, with the market with the lowest pendency period averaging 1.4 years and 
the market with the longest period at 4.8 years.  Software development is a very fast-moving process, with 
typical development cycles measured in months rather than years.  Thus, almost all of the patents in force 
at the time of potential entry will have been filed well in advance of any actual product launch.  It should 
also be noted that any bias created by incumbents filing patents in response to the threat of entry is likely 
to be positive (that is, biasing the coefficient towards zero). 
Recognizing that endogeneity of patenting may nonetheless be an important problem, we look to 
an independent source of variation in the impact of patents—changes during our sample period in the 
legal regime governing software patents that progressively clarified and expanded patentability of 
software inventions.  Significantly, these changes affected different markets in our sample at different 
times.  Hall and MacGarvie (2010) provide a detailed description of the legal changes covering software 
during this period.  In summary: prior to 1996, patent protection was generally understood to be limited to 
software used in manufacturing or otherwise tied to physical processes, as specified by the Supreme 
Court’s Diamond v. Diehr decision of 1981; software more generally was covered after 1996;
14 and 
financial, business methods software and disembodied algorithms became more clearly patentable after 
                                                      
12  Citations are subject to a variety of problems, and may be difficult to interpret directly as evidence of knowledge 
flow, see Alcacer, Gittelman and Sampat (2009), but are correlated with market value of patents, probability of 
being litigated and other indicators of economic value.  See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) and Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajenberg (2005). 
13 Bessen and Hunt (2007) argue that only 5% of software patents belong to software publishers.  
14 The ground-breaking decision was In re Alappat, issued in 1994, but this “left important questions unanswered” 
(Durant 1995) and a series of court cases in 1994 and 1995 led the USPTO to issue definitive and comprehensive 
new guidelines on software patentability in 1996 which increased the probability that issued software patents would 
be held valid (Laurie and Siino 1995).   10
the State Street decision in 1998.  This differential evolution in patentability across markets and over time 
can be seen in the differences in the volume and growth rates of patenting across different patent classes 
within software during the 1980s and 1990s, with technologies in which the regime change took place 
earlier seeing earlier increases in the growth of patenting (see Figure 1 in the Appendix).
15   
This variation provides a useful source of identification.  A granted patent in principle represents 
a right to exclude others from commercializing an invention, but in practice many issued patents may not 
be upheld in court.
16  This is particularly likely to be the case when standards of patentability are 
controversial or evolving.  Thus, while many firms did file patents covering software inventions and 
many software patents were indeed granted prior to the expansion of patentability, the validity and 
enforceability of these patents was uncertain.  The regime changes increased the probability that a given 
software patent would be found valid upon litigation and increased the number of inventions that could be 
patented.  Thus while increases in the number of patents relevant to a market can be expected to reduce 
entry rates, after a regime shift we expect to see even greater increases in barriers to entry associated with 
patents and larger reductions in entry rates.   
The degree to which these regime changes are an independent source of variation in the strength 
of patents is, obviously, an important question. Again, institutional features of the software industry are 
useful.  In most of these markets prior to our sample period, many of the patents we have identified as 
being relevant were held by hardware producers.  These firms were active in patent-intensive markets 
outside software, had developed advanced internal IP-related resources and capabilities, and were 
therefore likely to have a high propensity to file patent applications in any technology and to seek 
licensing revenues from potential infringers.  In contrast, there is evidence that many software firms did 
not support the changes in patentability, and had invested very little in patenting their products.  At 
hearings held by the USTPO in 1994, major differences in attitudes towards software patents emerged 
between these groups of firms
17 and Mann (2007) shows that firms like Adobe, Autodesk, Computer 
Associates and Oracle came late to the software patent game (in terms of applications filed).  Arguably, 
                                                      
15 While the legal changes we describe are the crucial ones, later developments are worth mentioning. In 1999, 
Congress established prior user rights to alleged infringers of business methods patents able to prove that they had 
been commercially exploiting the invention for at least one year before the patent was filed. This change may have 
slightly reduced the value of business methods patents held by entrants. In 2000, the USPTO began devoting 
additional review time to business methods applications (the "second pair of eyes" policy) which may have 
improved the quality of issued patents in that area. The effects of higher-quality patents are controlled for in our 
regressions by the inclusion of the number of forward citations per patent. 
16 Lemley and Shapiro (2005) describe patents as “probabilistic patents” and note that only 0.1% of patents are 
litigated to trial, and half of litigated patents are found to be invalid. 
17  According to one article published in Computer Lawyer in October 1995, at these hearings “most of the large 
hardware manufacturers (e.g., Apple, AT&T, Digital Equipment, IBM, Intel, Silicon Graphics, and Sun 
Microsystems) and a few large software companies (e.g., Microsoft and Taligent) generally supported extending 
patent protection to software inventions. On the other side, several large software companies, including Adobe, 
Autodesk, and Oracle, and many small software developers opposed patent protection for software, as inhibiting the 
development of new software products.”     11
therefore, changes in the strength of software patents during this period were not completely anticipated 
by many industry participants,
18 and these changes meant that markets in which  firms had (for whatever 
reason) previously filed larger numbers of patents saw exogenous increases in entry barriers compared to 
otherwise similar markets in which few patents had been filed.  
The timing of patent applications and long lags in granting patents also help with identification.  
Shifts in the legal regime have an immediate effect on the strength of granted patents and pending 
applications that predate the regime change, but any increase in applications filed by incumbents in 
response to the threat of entry would not result in an increase in patents granted until several years after 
the change. This means that any change in the correlation between patenting and entry over the period 
immediately following the regime change will not be contaminated by simultaneity bias arising from 
patents filed in response to the threat of entry.  Note also that because these legal changes affected the 
strength of software patents but did not change the underlying innovation protected by the patent, they 
further help to distinguish the effects of stronger property rights from the effects of more innovation. 
Empirical Approach and Estimation Results 
Our regression analysis of the relationship between patents and entry begins with a simple 
discrete choice model of entry decisions.
 19  Firms are assumed to enter markets when expected profits net 
of entry costs are greater than zero.
 20   We estimate a single equation logit discrete hazard model of the 
form  
y*it = ’xit+it   yit =1 if y*it >0, 0 otherwise 
where xit is a vector of variables capturing costs and benefits of  entry and the dependent variable yit 
equals 1 in the year that the firm enters a market, and 0 before.  Firms are dropped from the regression 
once they have entered a market.  Following Berry (1992) and Scott Morton (1999), we begin by treating 
all the software firms in our sample that have not previously entered a market as potential entrants.  The 
full dataset would have 57,167 firm-year combinations and 27 markets, for a total of 1,543,509 
observations.  To guard against understating our standard errors, we use the state-based sampling 
technique advocated by Manski and Lerman (1977) and used by Silverman (1999) in an analogous 
context, sampling 10% of the non-entrants in each market and 100% of the entrants.
21  Summary statistics 
                                                      
18 Hall and MacGarvie (2010) find a statistically significant market reaction (measured in terms of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns) to the USPTO’s 1996 announcement and issuance of new guidelines on software patentability, 
suggesting this regime shift was not completely foreseen by the market. 
19 Our empirical approach is closely related to Greenstein and Wade (1998), who study entry, exit and the product 
cycle in the commercial mainframe computer market, as well as to Scott Morton (1999), which analyzes generic 
entry in pharmaceuticals and Kyle (2006), which studies international entry patterns in pharmaceuticals.   
20 Deciding to enter means that the firm has chosen to commercialize its invention internally.  Conversely, a decision 
not to enter may mean either that the firm has chosen to exploit its invention via licensing, or that it has abandoned 
commercialization entirely. 
21 We also experimented with more restrictive definitions of the set of potential entrants, for example by defining 
potential entrants as those firms that have not previously entered an “adjacent” market (the same broad SOF   12
from the firm-level database are found in Table 3, and these show that entrants on average have 
substantially more patents than non-entrants, are larger, and are more likely to have experience in other 
markets. 
As discussed above, all else equal, we expect entry to be negatively associated with the total 
number of patents relevant to a market.  However these costs may be mitigated if the potential entrant has 
its own patents: these may improve its position in bargaining over license terms, provide a basis for 
threatening to counter-sue if an incumbent threatens to try and enforce its patents.  An entrant which has 
its own patents may also have better access to capital markets (Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009), Mann 
(2007), Hsu and Ziedonis (2008)), or be anticipating higher profits from a product which is an innovation 
over existing technologies.  All else equal, we therefore expect entry to be positively associated with a 
potential entrant’s own patent holdings. Table 4 presents results.  Estimated coefficients are consistent 
with these core hypotheses: the hazard of entry is substantially lower in markets with more patents, but 
this effect is somewhat offset for entrants who have their own patents.  The estimated hazard ratio for the 
log of total patents in the market
22 is far below one, while the estimated hazard ratio for the dummy 
variable for whether the firm holds or has applied for patents relevant to the market) is significantly 
greater than one.  The estimated entry-deterring effect of the number of patents in the market is 
economically as well as statistically significant: one log unit increase in total patents in the market (about 
2/3 of a standard deviation) results in a 50-60% lower hazard of entry, corresponding to an elasticity of 
about -0.8.   
Other explanatory variables are intended to control for demand and market structure (the number 
of incumbent firms in the market and the number of incumbents squared, plus the growth in revenues in 
the market over the previous two years, a proxy for the four-firm concentration ratio and its square
23), and 
the stage of the product cycle as captured by a set of dummies for each decile of the modal citation lag of 
patents granted in that product market.
24  Time invariant unobserved characteristics of markets are 
                                                                                                                                                                           
category, i.e. AI for artificial intelligence). As an alternative, we relax the potential entrants assumption by including 
presence in an adjacent market as an explanatory variable in the regression. The results were similar to those 
reported here.  
22  This is the total number of patents relevant to the market, as defined by the concordance of patent classes to SOF 
classes found in the appendix.  While these patents are held by a set of firms that certainly includes the incumbent 
firms in the market, they may also be held by firms that are not active in the market. 
23 Unfortunately, we do not have reliable or complete market-level sales data. We create a proxy for this as follows. 
For firm i active in in market j as well as n-1 other markets, we compute average sales per market in market j as 
SALESi/n (the total sales of the firm divided by the number of markets in which it is active). We then add up the 
average sales per market for all firms active in the market. It is thus important to note that these variables should be 
viewed as proxies for the true growth and concentration of sales.  For example, the CR4 is almost certainly too high 
due to our inability to perfectly distinguish the market-level sales of a few very large firms from their total sales. For 
the firms that have missing sales, we interpolate sales as the average firm sales when computing the CR4 so as not to 
underestimate the total sales in the market. 
24  Entry and patenting are both likely to be correlated with the stage of the product cycle (Gort and Klepper (1982) 
document a surge in the rate of patenting in a market in last stage of the product cycle, when entry is low.) This   13
controlled for with market fixed effects.  We also perform robustness checks (see Table 6) which include 
market-level fixed effects interacted with linear and quadratic trend variables. These interaction terms 
control for market-level heterogeneity that changes over time. We control for some observable 
characteristics of each potential entrant: firm age since founding, a measure of firm size based on a 
categorical measure of revenues
25, and prior experience in related markets as captured by the lagged 
number of “adjacent” or related markets in which the firm is active, and a lagged count of the number of 
other unrelated markets (outside the broad SOF class) in which the firm operates.
26   Standard errors are 
clustered by firm to account for potential correlation across observations caused by unobserved firm-
specific factors.  
As can be seen in Table 4, after controlling for demand with the growth of revenues, the number 
of incumbents enters our model with a positive sign, and the number of incumbents squared has a 
negative coefficient.  Both are significant at the 5% level in all specifications.  Thus, when the number of 
firms in the market is small, increases in the size of the market are associated with increases in entry—
presumably reflecting a reduction in the market power of incumbents or a reduction of barriers to entry 
created by network effects.  For markets with larger numbers of incumbents, however, increases in the 
number of incumbents reduce the probability of entry, which could reflect the fact that large numbers of 
incumbents indicate more mature, more crowded, and less attractive markets.  A similar pattern emerges 
in the coefficients on the four-firm concentration ratio, with a positive coefficient on the linear term and a 
negative coefficient on the squared term. Our proxy for the growth rate of revenues in a product market is 
positively and significantly related to the rate of entry.  The modal citation lag coefficients (not reported 
but available upon request) display a pattern in which there is an initial increase in the rate of entry as the 
modal lag increases, followed by a decrease and then an increase in the coefficient when the modal lag 
becomes very long.  These coefficients are as one would expect given the relationship between the rate of 
entry and the stage of the product cycle. We find that the probability of entering a given market is 
increasing in the number of adjacent markets the firm has already entered.  Similarly, the number of 
unrelated markets in which firms have experience is a significant positive predictor of entry (being active 
in one more of these markets increases the hazard of entry by around 28%).  Following Silverman (1999), 
                                                                                                                                                                           
observation is likely to be less relevant in fast-moving technologies with short product lifecycles such as software.  
Nonetheless, we control for the modal citation lag to patents in the product class as an indicator of the maturity of 
the technology.  For each product class and citing-cited year pair, we compute the citation frequency, or ratio of 
actual to potential citations (see Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999)), and then identify the citation lag (citing year – cited 
year) with the highest citation frequency for a given product class and citing year.   
25 This is a set of dummies for each category of revenue: 0 = under $1m; 1 = $1m - $2.5m; 2 = $2.5m - $5m; 3 = 
$5m - $10m; 4 = $10m - $25m; 5 = $25m - $50m;6 = $50m - $100m; 7 = $100m - $250m; 8 = $250m - $500m; 9 = 
Over $500m. 
26 Here we define other markets in terms of the aggregate SOF categories (e.g. AI: Artificial Intelligence), to reflect 
the fact that the benefits of experience in a broadly defined area is likely to be common across more detailed product 
classes.   14
which includes a measure of the relevance or relatedness of a potential entrant’s technological capability 
to any given market, we distinguish in column (2) between the firm’s patents related to a particular 
market and a dummy for whether the firm ever patents in any market during our sample.
27  The inclusion 
of the latter dummy helps us to interpret the coefficient on the firm’s patents in a particular market as the 
value of IP related to the market in question, holding constant other firm characteristics correlated with 
patenting more generally.  We observe that, while there is a positive and significant effect of ever 
patenting at all in any market (which increases the hazard of entry by 23%), the effect of having patents in 
a particular market is almost three times as important (increases the hazard of entry by 124%).  Though 
not reported here due to space constraints, the effect of the firm’s size (revenues) on the probability of 
entry is concave.   
The average quality of patents in the market, as captured by forward citations, has a large and 
strongly significant negative effect on entry.  This effect is distinguishable from the number of patents per 
se.  This result is consistent both with the idea that higher numbers of citations suggest “larger” patents, 
which are more difficult to invent around, and with the idea that higher numbers of citations reflect more 
significant past innovation by incumbents—both of which will tend to deter entry.  Similarly, the average 
quality of “own” patents held by potential entrants, as measured by the number of forward citations per 
patent, is also positively and significantly associated with the rate of entry.  This suggests that entrants 
with higher quality patents may find it easier to bargain their way into the market.  A striking finding of 
this model (as seen in columns 1 and 3) is that entrants’ “pipeline” of pending applications is a stronger 
predictor of entry than the number of granted patents: entry is positively associated with a dummy for 
having any patent applications and with the ratio of patent applications to grants, but not with cumulative 
patent grants or a dummy for having patents granted (after controlling for applications).  
We also find that, consistent with our expectations, the effects of both the firms’ own patents and 
the number of patents in the market are diminished when a firm is active in other markets.  In column (7) 
we estimate negative and significant coefficient on the firm’s patent application dummy interacted with 
the number of related markets in which the firm has experience. There is also a positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction of the firm’s experience in related markets (markets with the same broad 
product category definition) and the number of patents in the focal market (market j). These results 
suggest that the negative effects of incumbents’ patents on entry are mitigated when potential entrants 
have complementary assets (proxied here by experience in other markets), and that having patent 
applications is significantly more positively related with entry for firms with no experience in related 
markets.  Similar findings are obtained in column (8) for the interaction terms between firms’ and 
                                                      
27 In results not reported in the table, we estimated a positive and significant relationship between Silverman 
(1999)’s RELTECH measure and the rate of entry.    15
markets’ patents and the number of unrelated markets in which the firm operates (markets with a different 
broad product category).  
  As discussed above, it may not be just the absolute number of patents in an area that can deter 
entry, but also the total cost to an entrant of licensing its way through the thicket.  One salient feature of 
patent thickets is the potential for higher costs associated with negotiating with many parties.  To the 
extent that there are fixed costs of conducting a negotiation, having to deal with more parties will drive up 
costs of obtaining licenses.  There may also be transactions costs associated with bargaining and 
coordinating negotiations with multiple licensors.
28  We calculate the number of different assignees 
whose patents are cited by patents relevant to the market in question, which can be thought of a proxy for 
the number of distinct licensors that an entrant would have to negotiate with in order to license its way in 
to a market.  The results in column (4) in Table 4 are consistent with the idea that increases in the 
potential number of licensors increase entry costs, with a negative and significant estimated coefficient on 
the number of cited assignees per forward citation in a market.  In this regression the count of cited 
assignees is normalized by the number of forward citations in the market to reduce collinearity among the 
explanatory variables.
29  
Endogeneity and regime change results 
In Table 4 we address identification of a causal effect of patent thickets on entry using 
differences-in-differences estimates that exploit the changes in the legal regime affecting patentability of 
software relevant to different markets discussed above.  To take advantage of this source of exogeneity, 
we estimate the effects of patents on entry in a difference-in-differences type of analysis in column (5) of 
Table 4, where we include a dummy variable equal to one in each market following the regime change, 
and its interaction with the number of patents in the market.
30  The negative and significant coefficient on 
the interaction term indicates a negative treatment effect of strengthened patent rights on entry.  In 
column (6)  we consider three time periods: pre regime-change, the initial period following the regime 
change, and later years after the regime change.  We focus on the change in the coefficient on the 
market’s patents during the period immediately following the regime change, because long administrative 
                                                      
28 See Noel and Schankerman (2006) and Ziedonis (2004). 
29 The resulting variable enters the regression in log form.  In alternate versions of this regression, negative 
coefficients were also obtained on the number of cited assignees, but standard errors were difficult to estimate 
precisely due to collinearity with the number of patents in the market. 
30 The precise timing of the regime shift in each market is laid out in Table A.3. We assigned markets to one of three 
groups. The first group includes software related to manufacturing or tied to physical processes, which should have 
been considered patentable following Diamond v. Diehr in 1981. This includes automatic teller machine, robotic, 
quality control, and peripheral device driver software. Another group of markets are those relating to business 
methods and financial applications, which became patentable following the State Street decision in 1998, which in 
our sample includes invoicing/billing, tax preparation, inventory management, and order entry/processing software. 
The remaining markets are considered to have been affected by the USPTO’s issuance of new guidelines over 
software patents in 1995-96, which allowed for software patents as long as they were not embedded in physical 
media.   16
delays at the patent office prevent incumbent firms from reacting to the “treatment” by obtaining 
additional patents.
 31  We show that only the immediate effect is significant, indicating that the 
intensification of the negative effect of patents on entry is restricted to the initial period following the 
regime change, during which the increase in the number of patents in the market would largely be the 
result of the processing of applications filed before the regime change. This suggests that the estimated 
negative effect of patents in the market is not driven by the endogenous response of incumbents filing 
more patents in reaction to the regime change.  The coefficient on the main effect of the patents in the 
market variable remains negative and significant in all these regressions. 
In contrast to the results on the intensification of the entry-deterring effect, we do not observe a 
statistically significant increase in the impact of firms’ own patents on the probability of entry following a 
regime change.  This suggests that the entry-deterring effect of the market’s patents intensified once 
software became more patentable, but the entry-promoting effect did not.  If the property-right component 
of entrants’ patents were a significant determinant of entry, this should have become more valuable 
following a regime change, with a positive estimated coefficient on the interaction term.  The fact that 
there is no significant change in the association between firms’ own patents and entry may imply that the 
estimated main effect is mainly picking up the fact that firms with better technologies are both more 
likely to patent and more likely to enter markets, rather than the property right effect.  
Robustness 
The difference-in-differences approach we employ here relies upon the assumption that the legal 
changes were exogenous, or more precisely, were not driven by other factors that simultaneously changed 
the relationship between patenting and entry.
32  For example, if some other change took place at around 
the same time as the legal changes and led to both an increase in the rate of patenting and a decline in the 
rate of entry, identification of a casual effect of patents on entry will be compromised.  But because pre-
regime-change markets are used as a control group, for such a confounding factor to explain our findings, 
it would have to have affected each of the relevant markets separately at exactly the same time as the 
legal change.  Results are also contingent on the timing and application of the regime shifts to each 
market.  As an additional robustness check, we randomly assigned the “regime” dummy to markets while 
                                                      
31 The length of the period “immediately” following the regime change is determined by the length of the grant lag 
in the years following the change.  As of 2000, the median grant lag in markets affected by the first regime change  
(in March 1996) averaged 2.8 years, so that a large share of the patents granted up to 2000 were filed before the 
USPTO issued new guidelines in 1996. By 2004, the median grant lag in markets affected by the State Street 
decision in July 1998 averaged 3.8 years, and was as long as 4.7 years in billing software. We therefore restrict the 
period “immediately” following the first regime change to 1998-2000, while the corresponding period after State 
Street is 2000-2004.  
32 It is certainly possible that some firms filed more patents in anticipation of legal changes, which if true, would 
bias our estimates of the effects of patents on entry towards zero.  But note that this effect works against a finding of 
a significant effect on entry, and as stated previously there is evidence that many software firms (as opposed to 
hardware firms) did not support the changes in patentability and were late in starting to file large numbers of 
software patents.    17
preserving the number of markets that were post-regime change in each year.  We find that in such a 
specification with a random regime variable, the regime X patents coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
We also find that the latter interaction is insignificant at the 5% level when we shift the date of the regime 
change forward or backward in time within each market.   
Another important assumption underlying our analysis is the definition of markets used to 
measure entry and identify relevant patents.  We have considered the possibility that technological change 
could have led some of the markets in our sample to become more fragmented into sub-markets not 
captured by the CorpTech market definitions at around the same time as our regime changes.  If this did 
indeed happen, we might see declines in observed entry rates (because entry into the submarkets would 
not necessarily be captured) associated with an increase in patenting that could spuriously generate our 
regime change findings.  But if this effect is responsible for our findings, we would expect to see it 
primarily in the largest markets or in the markets that saw the biggest declines in concentration, and our 
results are robust to a variety of specifications that account for this potential fragmentation.
33  
Another possible omitted variable is the rise of the internet.  The growth of internet-related 
businesses, for example, would be associated with an increase in both the rate of entry and the rate of 
patenting, which would lead to a positive coefficient on the interaction of the market’s patent stock and 
the rate of entry. We find the opposite – a negative and significant estimated coefficient on this interaction 
term.  Our main regressions and regime change results are similarly robust to dropping the “internet 
tools” market from the sample. We also experimented with including a dummy variable for markets in 
which Microsoft was active, and the results were robust to the inclusion of this control.  
Endogeneity and patenting by potential entrants 
A second source of potential endogeneity in the single-equation discrete-time hazard model is 
patenting by entrant or potential entrant firms.  The positive effect of a firm’s own patents on entry may 
be subject to simultaneity bias if firms’ decisions to enter a market and to apply for patents are jointly 
determined (for example, if there are unobserved differences across firms in R&D productivity that make 
the most productive firms more likely to patent and enter markets).
 34  To correct for this bias, we use a 
Bivariate Probit (BVP) model, with separate equations for the firm’s decision to patent an innovation and 
to enter the market.  This type of model has been used by, for example, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) to 
model the complementarity between internal R&D and external knowledge acquisition, and allows us to 
                                                      
33 We tried dropping the largest markets, and interacting of the number of patents in the market with the number of 
incumbents. We also dropped markets with the biggest declines in the CR4 and interacted the regime dummy and 
the CR4 and CR4 squared. All of these regressions confirmed that our results are not driven by increased 
fragmentation within markets. 
34 This two-equation approach has some similarities to the model of Hunt (2006) who models jointly determined 
R&D and patenting decisions in the presence of overlapping property rights.   18
account for the endogenous nature of the firm’s patenting decision in the entry equation by allowing for 
correlation in the errors of the entry and patenting equations.
 35   
The Bivariate Probit model takes the following form: define dummy variables y1 =1 if the firm 
enters the market and 0 otherwise, and y2 = 1 if the firm files a patent and zero otherwise. Let x1 and x2 be 
vectors of variables influencing entry and patenting.  We then specify a two-equation model where 
y*1 = 1’x1+1   y1 =1 if y*1 >0, 0 otherwise 




Assuming that the firm decides first whether or not to patent, making patenting costs sunk, we 
can write this model as a recursive simultaneous equations model in which the joint distribution of y1 and 
y2 is given by: 
Prob[y1 =1, y2 = 1| x1, x2] =21’x1+y22’x2 
where 2 is the cdf of the bivariate normal distribution.
36  In this model we use the number of non-
software patents previously filed by the firm as an additional identifying instrument for the probability the 
firm has filed a software patent in year t.  This variable instruments for propensity to patent: if a firm has 
experience navigating the patent system for technologies other than software, that firm should lower costs 
of obtaining a software patent.   
The estimates of the BVP model for various model specifications are contained in Table 5.  Both 
the patenting equation and the entry equation include the covariates used in the single-equation model. 
The patent equation additionally includes the number of non-software patents held by the firm as an 
instrument. The firm’s patent application dummy is an explanatory variable in the entry equation, so that 
this is a recursive simultaneous-equations model.   
Most of the estimated effects are similar to those found in the single-equation model.  However, 
the effects of the market’s patents and the firm’s patents both fall in magnitude in the BVP model relative 
to the single-equation entry model, consistent with a reduction in simultaneity bias.  For example, in the 
single-equation entry model, a firm having filed any patent applications has a roughly three times greater 
odds of entry, whereas in the BVP model this increase is only around 45%. The odds ratio on the log of 
the patents in the market is around 0.4 in the single-equation model and 0.7 in the BVP model.  The 
estimated correlation coefficient of the error terms across equations is positive and statistically significant 
(at the 5% or 10% level, depending on the specification). 
                                                      
35 As Greene (1998) observes, “in the bivariate probit model, unlike in the linear simultaneous equations model, if 
the two dependent variables are jointly determined, we just put each on the right hand side of the other equation (or, 
in our case, one of them) and proceed as if there were no simultaneity problem.”  
36 See Greene (1999) p. 848, and Greene (1998) for an example.     19
The estimated effect of the number of patents in the market on entrant/potential entrant firms’ 
probability of patenting is positive, though not significant.  Consistent with our hypothesis that experience 
in non-software patenting may lower costs of obtaining software patents, or that firms vary in their 
propensity to patent, this variable is a strong predictor of patenting, with a t-ratio of 27.13 in the patenting 
equation corresponding to a first-stage F-statistic of 208.7.  However it appears to be uncorrelated with 
the firm’s entry decision except through its effect on propensity to obtain software patents: when the 
number of the firm’s non-software patents are included as an explanatory variable in the entry equation, 
the point estimate of the effect is essentially zero and is statistically insignificant with a p-value of 0.84.   
The effect of the number of patents in the market on the probability of entry is economically 
significant, and we see a substantial difference between firms that patent and those that do not.  A one 
percent increase in the number of patents in the market is associated with a 0.34% decrease in the 
probability that a firm has patents and enters the market (Pr (y1=1, y2=1)). Meanwhile, the elasticity of the 
probability that the firm has no patents and enters the market (Pr(y1=1, y2=0)) with respect to the number 
of patents in the market is -0.84.
37 
In addition to using the instrumental variable to control for endogeneity of own patenting, we 
address potential endogeneity of incumbents’ patenting in the entry equation, using the same differences-
in-differences approach as in Table 4.  As can be seen in the estimates reported for the models in columns 
(5) and (6), and (7) and (8), very similar results are obtained. 
  While we believe that these firm-level estimates, where we can control to some degree for firm-
specific characteristics and directly measure decisions not to enter, are most helpful for understanding the 
determinants of the firm’s entry decision, we have also estimated an aggregate market-level model of 
entry rates.  Table 6 presents results.  The specification of these regressions are essentially the same as in 
Table 4, however because the dependent variable is a count we use a Poisson regression model with 
market fixed effects and robust standard errors is used to estimate the parameters.
38   
Consistent with the firm-level results, we find a negative and significant relationship between the 
log of the number of patents in the market and the rate of entry. The estimates from the market-level 
model generally confirm those of the firm-level model, and we include several additional robustness 
                                                      
37 The magnitude of the effect of own patents on entry estimated using instrumental variables should be interpreted 
carefully. As shown by Angrist and Imbens (1995), the estimates obtained from instrumental variables are 
informative about the effect of the “treatment” only on firms induced to patent software by their history of non-
software patenting.  If the marginal firms induced to patent by their history of patenting non-software are those 
valuing patents less highly, while the firms patenting software independent of their patenting histories value patents 
highly, our instrumented estimates may in fact underestimate the effect of firms’ patents on entry. 
38 Wooldridge (2002) explains that if the underlying distribution is truly Negative Binomial, the Negative Binomial 
estimator is more efficient than the Poisson, but if the distributional assumption is wrong, the Poisson is still 
consistent as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified.  In practice, we found that there was essentially no 
difference between results obtained using a fixed-effects Negative Binomial model and those obtained from the 
Poisson model. The former are available upon request.   20
checks. First of all, we show in columns (3) and (4) that the main result is robust to the inclusion of a 
linear trend interacted market-level fixed effects (or a quadratic trend interacted with these effects). 
Columns 5 and 6 examine the impact of legal changes in patentability on the entry-deterring 
effects of patents.  We find that for entrants as a whole, the relationship between the number of patents in 
the market and the rate of entry is exacerbated (with a significant coefficient of -0.10 on the interaction of 
the market’s patent stock and the regime change dummy).
39  For de novo entrants (which we define as 
firms younger than 10 years old who specialize in one aggregate SOF class
40 – e.g. AI: artificial 
intelligence), the effect is stronger—the coefficient on the interaction between market’s patent stock and 
the regime shift dummy is -0.32 and significant at the 1% level in column 7.  This suggests that the 
strengthening of IP rights in software led to a more substantial intensification of the entry-deterring effect 
of patents for young, specialized firms than for established companies.
41 
The magnitudes of the coefficients described in this paper should be interpreted carefully. 
Holding constant average patent quality, a 1% increase in patents is associated with approximately a 0.8% 
decline in entry, which may seem a surprisingly large effect.  Note however that the “pure” property 
rights effect associated with strengthening of software patents is much smaller: the interaction of patents 
with regime change adds only -0.1 to the main effect of patents in the market.  Interpreting this as an 
estimate of the effect of going from no patent protection over software to strong patent protection, the 
deterrent effect on entry is rather small. However, if one views the regime changes as a mild increase in 
the strength of patents, the deterrent effect appears larger.  Thus, this coefficient remains somewhat open 
to interpretation. 
Secondly, it is important to think about whether an increase in patenting holding constant forward 
citations per patent (patent quality) is a likely real-world outcome.  In our data, we observe a negative 
correlation between the number of patents in the market and the average number of forward citations 
received by these patents. This is partly due to a truncation effect (controlled for by the inclusion of year 
effects in our regressions), but it may also reflect the issuance of larger numbers of relatively less 
important patents in some markets. Note that if we assume that the number of forward citations per 
patents falls as the number of patents granted grows, the magnitude of the effect of patents on entry is 
lower.  Under this interpretation, “frivolous” or purely strategic patents without much technological value 
are not predicted to have as significant an effect on entry.  
                                                      
39 When we drop citations per patent from the regression, the coefficient on the number of patents in the market is -
0.2 (s.e. of 0.11) and the regime X patents coefficient is -0.12 (s.e. of 0.05). Thus, without holding constant patent 
quality, the effects of patents pre-regime change are substantially smaller, but the post-regime change effect is 
similar. 
40 We measure firm age as the time elapsed since the founding date reported in Corptech.  11% of the entrants  
in the sample meet this criteria.   
41 GMM estimation of the market-level regressions using the models suggested by Chamberlain (1992) and 
Wooldridge (1997), or Blundell, Griffith and Windmeijer (2002), gave similar coefficients.   21
Discussion and Conclusions 
Patents appear to have a significant effect on competition and entrant/incumbent interaction in 
software markets.  In this context, where patents are thought to be particularly problematic in creating 
transactions costs, we estimate substantial elasticities of entry with respect to patents held by incumbents 
and non-competitors in the range of -0.3 to -0.8.  Because patents are both a property right that allows 
patent holders to exclude competitors, and an indicator of technological capabilities, it can be difficult to 
interpret a negative association between patents and entry: are entry rates lower because the incumbents’ 
patents raise entry costs, or because incumbents are out-innovating entrants?  Here we use exogenous 
changes in the legal regime governing software patents, along with a control for the quality of patents in a 
market, to identify a distinct and significant “property rights” effect.  Interestingly, the deterrent effect of 
patents is substantially less negative when entrants arrive at the market with their own patents.  Where we 
explicitly model firms’ joint decisions to obtain their own patents and to enter the market, we find an 
almost three times larger negative effect of existing patents on entry when entrants lack patents. 
We also find that patents appear to be substitutes for complementary assets and capabilities in 
determining entry: the estimated value of entrants’ own patent holdings in the entry process is lower for 
those firms that have prior experience entering other markets, and patent thickets matter less for firms 
with experience. While this result is difficult to interpret definitively without much finer detail on firms’ 
products and entry strategies than we have been able to collect, it highlights the significance of co-
specialized complementary assets for competition in knowledge-intensive industries. 
Patent thickets, at least as measured here, thus appear to substantially raise entry costs.  This is 
not to say that the overall effect of strengthening software patents was necessarily negative, at least in an 
absolute sense.  The markets in our sample saw substantial overall growth in sales and in the number of 
participants during this period.  Any negative impact of patent thickets on entry is felt as forgone potential 
for even higher rates of entry, and this may be mitigated by the stimulating effects of stronger patent 
protection.  As discussed above, strengthening or clarifying property rights has potential benefits as well 
as costs, and we estimate a positive and significant main effect of regime changes on entry, all else equal.  
But transactions costs associated with thickets may have interesting dynamic effects: while incumbents 
enjoy increased protection for current innovations, larger thickets will also raise their costs of introducing 
future generations of innovations.  With both entrants and incumbents facing strong incentives to acquire 
patents, which in turn contribute to even larger thickets and higher associated transactions costs, all 
market participants can become negatively affected.  These dynamics may underlie opportunities 
emerging for new organizational forms and business models that eliminate (or arbitrage) transactions 
costs associated with patent thickets.  Some privately funded entities have begun to assemble large 
portfolios of software patents, with the apparent intent to sell access at a single “one-stop shopping” price   22
that reflects internalization of transactions costs.  Other software producers are side-stepping the whole 
problem by operating in the open source world. 
A striking finding is that, while firms holding patents related to a market are much more likely to 
enter it, relatively few of the entrant firms in our sample came to market with patents—and only a 
minority of entrants in the sample held patents by 2004.
42  There are a variety of reasons why a 
prospective entrant might not obtain any patents. These firms may not have been innovators (rather 
unlikely in software, where new products dominate and the pace of technological change is very high), or 
may have made strategic decisions to ignore incumbents’ patents or (unobserved by us) may have taken a 
license on terms offered by the incumbent.  It may also be the case that compared to alternate IP strategies 
such as Open Source or reliance on trade secrets, copyright, and speed to market, for many firms the costs 
of obtaining patents outweigh perceived benefits.  But this finding also points to an important role for 
sophisticated management of new enterprises and prompt responses to environmental changes: some 
firms may simply have failed to appreciate the strategic value of patents in this industry—giving those 
that quickly and effectively acquired the ability to manage IP a significant advantage in this dynamic 
sector.
                                                      
42 30% of entrants in our sample held at least one patent in any technology class by 2006.   23
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Table 1: Summary statistics by market 




Count of Patents 
in force 
Number of Cited 
Assignees 























Artificial intelligence R&D  33.50  0.07  0.83 -0.13  1135.33 0.12  294.67  0.13 
Automatic teller machine 
software 
25.00 0.07  2.00 0.18 508.67  0.11 272.33  0.31 
Database query language 
software 
101.67 0.14  16.33 0.49  3177.67 0.33  993.17  0.37 
Desktop publishing software  50.83  0.07  4.83  0.62  1307.67 0.16  378.67  0.22 
Disaster recovery software  53.50  0.18 7.83  0.25  3863.50 0.15 739.50 0.16 
Electronic message systems 
software 
141.17 0.21  16.33 0.27  176.00  0.52  195.00  0.56 
Fax software  87.17  0.24  12.67  0.01  1198.33 0.48  715.50  0.41 
File management software  370.17  0.17 45.50  0.24  3057.00 0.30  859.83  0.33 
Geographic information 
systems software 
108.67 0.15  9.83  1.47  5626.83 0.12  757.00  0.12 
Hierarchical DBMS software  39.33  0.13  4.00  0.24  3177.67 0.33  993.17  0.37 
Internet tools  374.67  0.73  57.00  0.45  4729.83 0.36  1462.50  0.29 
Inventory management 
software 
592.00 0.05  35.17 0.20  575.17  0.15  366.17  0.15 
Invoicing/Billing Software  488.00  0.03  25.50  0.20  155.50  0.25  103.00  0.22 
Local area network (LAN) 
software 
68.00 0.30  10.17  0.14 4057.67 0.35 1274.67  0.30 
Natural language software  13.50  0.18  2.00  0.15  1323.83 0.11  301.83  0.12 
Neural network software  17.00  0.20  2.00  -0.02  754.50  0.13  217.83  0.14 
Order entry/processing 
software 
413.17 0.06  31.17 0.17  1842.83 0.19  749.50  0.18 
Performance measuring 
software 
188.83 0.24  29.83 0.29  7433.67 0.11  810.83  0.11 
Peripheral device drivers  78.67  0.13  7.50  0.77  5603.50 0.16  892.83  0.13 
Quality control software  73.50  0.11 8.00  0.52  82.33  0.25  67.83  0.39 
Relational DBMS software  166.83  0.04 12.67  1.34  3177.67 0.33  993.17  0.37 
Robotic software  12.17  0.04  1.00  -0.17  422.67  0.08  153.33  0.19 
Security/auditing software  275.17  0.23  30.00  0.31  1037.67 0.26  404.67  0.24 
Tax preparation and reporting 
software 
115.83 0.03  6.50  0.02  16.67 0.11  14.92  -0.05 
Three dimensional 
representation software 
121.17 0.19  10.17 0.27  2549.50 0.10  562.00  0.12 
Voice technology software  73.17  0.24  7.17  0.47  3305.50 0.12  548.33  0.16 
Wide area network software  140.67  0.06  13.50  0.08  4057.67 0.35  1274.67  0.30 
Mean across markets  156.42  0.16  15.17  0.34  2383.51 0.22  607.29  0.23 
Median across markets  92  0.12  9  0.03  1283.5  0.19  432  0.16 
Growth rates are average annualized percentage growth rates in a market.   28
Table 2: Summary statistics on entry, markets grouped by terciles of the distribution of patents 
per incumbent in the market 
Mean Patents per incumbent  Mean # 





















Lower third  3.356  2.000  4.153  25.444  4.467  5.750  4.000 
Middle third  27.184  21.740  29.089  12.630  3.156  6.000  2.632 
Upper third  78.055  92.006  72.548  7.566  1.244  6.250  0.162 
 
* markets in the lower third group have fewer patents per incumbent in a given year than 66.7% of the markets in 
that year. 
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Table 3: Firm-level summary statistics 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
All firms 
Age 151475  15.432  12.087  0  229 
Firm’s revenues (in millions*) 77048  48.141  129.813  1  500 
Proxy for growth of sales in market j  151475  0.217  0.735  -1.172  2.611 
Proxy for CR4 in market j  151475  0.433  0.224  0  1 
Number of incumbents (in 100’s)   151475  1.583  1.744  0  6.880 
Number of related markets in which firm is active  149892  0.103  0.498  0  16 
Number of adjacent markets in which firm is active  149892  0.780  1.338  0  18 
Dummy for firm’s cumulative patents granted in market j  151475  0.010  0.099  0  1 
Dummy for firm’s cumulative patent applications in market j  151475  0.013  0.114  0  1 
Firm’s granted patents  in market j  151475  0.115  4.064  0  812 
Forward citations to firm’s patents in market j  151475  1.579  59.714  0  11323 
 
Entrants (firm-market-year observations in which enterijt =1) 
Age 2457  15.079  11.538  0  139 
Firm’s revenues (in millions*) 1654  85.304  164.321  1  500 
Proxy for growth of sales in market 2457  0.455  0.652  -1.172  2.611 
Proxy for CR4 in market  2457  0.277  0.163  0.093  1 
Number of incumbents (in 100’s)  2457  2.755  2.086  0.04  6.88 
Number of related markets in which firm is active   2455  0.426  1.083  0  16 
Number of adjacent markets in which firm is active  2455  1.691  2.037  0  18 
Dummy for firm’s cumulative patents granted in market j  2457  0.063  0.242  0  1 
Dummy for firm’s cumulative patent applications in market j  2457  0.078  0.268  0  1 
Firm’s granted patents  in market j  2457  1.065  11.755  0  298 
Forward citations to firm’s patents in market j  2457  15.807  185.811  0  6373 
 
Potential entrants (firm-market-year observations in which enterijt=0) 
         
Age 149018  15.437  12.096  0  229 
Firm’s revenues (in millions*) 75394  47.326  128.833  1  500 
Proxy for growth of sales in market 149018  0.213  0.736  -1.172  2.611 
Proxy for CR4 in market  149018  0.435  0.224  0  1 
Number of incumbents (in 100’s)  149018  1.564  1.731  0  6.88 
Number of related markets in which firm is active  147437  0.098  0.481  0  14 
Number of adjacent markets in which firm is active  147437  0.765  1.318  0  18 
Dummy for firm’s cumulative patents granted in market j  149018  0.009  0.095  0  1 
Dummy for firm’s cumulative patent applications in market j  149018  0.012  0.11  0  1 
Firm’s granted patents  in market j  149018  0.099  3.807  0  812 
Forward citations to firm’s patents in market j  149018  1.344  55.246  0  11323 
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Table 4: Discrete-time hazard model of entry.  
Coefficients expressed as odds ratios. Dependent variable = Enterijt.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
ln(# patents in market)  0.436  0.443  0.429 0.398 0.442 0.440   0.441 0.419 
  (0.107)*** (0.109)*** (0.106)*** (0.100)*** (0.118)*** (0.120)***  (0.119)**  (0.102)*** 
ln(fwd citations per 
patent in mkt) 
0.230 0.242 0.225 0.136 0.287 0.260  0.260 0.226 
(0.139)** (0.146)** (0.136)** (0.088)*** (0.184)*  (0.177)**  (0.177)*  (0.135)** 
Firm’s granted patents   1.001  1.000             
(0.004)  (0.003)         
Firm’s patent apps per 
granted patent 
1.194  1.071         
(0.078)***  (0.046)         
Firm’s fwd citations per 
patent 
 1.030         
 (0.004)***         
Patents granted (dummy)      1.451 1.470 1.441 1.477  1.478 1.670 
    (0.335) (0.344) (0.689) (0.347)*  (0.335) (0.371)** 
Patents filed (dummy)      2.239  2.537 2.515 2.535  2.977 3.211 
    (0.448)*** (0.506)*** (0.730)*** (0.509)***  (0.592)**  (0.634)*** 
Ever  patents  (dummy)    1.231        
  (0.075)***        
Ln(assignees/fwd  cites)     0.680       
   (0.113)**       
D(Regime)      3.351      
    (2.680)      
D(Regime) X Patents 
granted  
    1.029      
    (0.561)      
D(Regime) X Market's 
patents 
    0.855      
    (0.044)***      
D(Regime) X Patents 
filed 
    1.010      
    (0.383)      
D(Regime) X Market's 
Fwd cites 
    0.990      
    (0.191)      
D(Early  Regime)       3.281    
     (1.254)***    
D(Early Regime) X 
Market’s Patents 
     0.855    
     (0.043)***    
D(Late  Regime)       2.118    
     (1.507)    
D(Late Regime) X 
Market’s Patents 
     0.896    
     (0.078)    
“Experience”† X firm’s 
patents 
       0.711  0.862 
       (0.071)**  (0.036)*** 
“Experience” † X 
market’s patents 
       1.038  1.012 
       (0.012)**  (0.006)** 
Age  0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976  0.977 0.976 
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***  (0.003)**  (0.003)*** 
Experience in related 
markets  
1.476 1.471 1.460 1.467 1.470 1.470  1.219 1.477 
(0.041)*** (0.041)*** (0.042)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)***  (0.080)**  (0.042)*** 
Experience in unrelated 
markets 
1.290 1.289 1.281 1.279 1.279 1.279  1.282 1.199 
(0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.024)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)***  (0.023)**  (0.055)*** 
# Incumbents (in 
hundreds) 
2.203 2.203 2.221 2.271 2.619 2.682  2.291 2.212 
(0.213)*** (0.214)*** (0.216)*** (0.220)*** (0.282)*** (0.293)***  (0.222)**  (0.215)*** 
# Incumbents squared  0.938  0.938  0.937 0.936 0.921 0.918  0.934 0.938 
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)***  (0.011)**  (0.011)*** 
growth of sales in SOF  1.769  1.763  1.753 1.757 1.790 1.786  1.727 1.745 
  (0.138)*** (0.138)*** (0.137)*** (0.138)*** (0.141)*** (0.142)***  (0.135)**  (0.136)*** 
Four-firm CR in SOF  15.286  15.958  15.721 19.655 28.296 30.404  17.369 15.494 
(12.672)*** (13.281)*** (13.109)*** (16.519)*** (24.907)*** (26.908)***  (14.431)**  (12.801)*** 
CR4 squared  0.035  0.033  0.033  0.026 0.022 0.020  0.030 0.035 
(0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.025)*** (0.022)*** (0.020)***  (0.029)**  (0.033)*** 
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses. Controls for firm revenues included.  149,892 Observations. 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% † “Experience” in col. (7) is in related markets; col. (8) is unrelated markets. 
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Table 5: Bivariate probit model 
Coefficients expressed as odds ratios. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







ln(Market's  patents)  1.156 0.743 1.156 0.722 1.167 0.755 
 (0.170)  (0.074)***  (0.170)  (0.074)*** (0.196)  (0.081)*** 
ln(Fwd cites per patent in 
market) 
0.976 0.617 0.975 0.509 0.953 0.677 
(0.357) (0.152)**  (0.356) (0.135)** (0.403)  (0.176) 
D(Patent  Filed)    1.456   1.449   1.481 
  (0.225)**   (0.225)**   (0.285)** 
Ln(assignees per forward 
cite) 
   0.865    
   (0.058)**    
D(Regime)      0.920  1.653 
    (0.637)  (0.533) 
D(Regime) X Market's 
Patents 
    0.973  0.939 
    (0.046)  (0.020)*** 
D(Regime) X Market's Fwd 
cites 
    1.073  0.992 
    (0.159)  (0.077) 
D(Regime) X Firm's 
granted Patents 
     1 . 3 0 3  
     (0.172)** 
D(Regime)  X  Patents  filed       0.773 
     ( 0 . 1 2 8 )  
ln(Firm's  non-sw  patents)  1.454   1.454   1.454   
(0.023)***   (0.023)***   (0.023)***   
Firm  age  0.995 0.990 0.995 0.990 0.995 0.990 
 (0.002)**  (0.001)***  (0.002)**  (0.001)*** (0.002)**  (0.001)*** 
Experience in related 
markets 
1.234 1.216 1.234 1.220 1.235 1.220 
(0.025)*** (0.016)*** (0.025)*** (0.016)*** (0.025)*** (0.016)*** 
Experience in unrelated 
markets 
1.053 1.123 1.053 1.123 1.053 1.122 
(0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** 
#  Incumbents  (in  100's)  0.880 1.427 0.880 1.442 0.887 1.523 
(0.061)* (0.060)***  (0.061)* (0.060)*** (0.063)*  (0.070)*** 
#  incumbents  squared  1.014 0.970 1.014 0.969 1.013 0.963 
(0.008)* (0.005)***  (0.008)* (0.005)*** (0.008)  (0.005)*** 
Growth  of  Sales  in  market  1.055 1.262 1.054 1.259 1.051 1.273 
(0.039) (0.043)***  (0.039) (0.043)*** (0.039)  (0.043)*** 
Four-firm  CR  in  market  0.600 2.845 0.600 3.057 0.615 3.505 
(0.247) (0.972)***  (0.247) (1.054)*** (0.254)  (1.254)*** 
CR4  squared  1.449 0.280 1.448 0.258 1.391 0.243 
(0.601) (0.105)***  (0.601) (0.098)*** (0.583)  (0.095)*** 
Rho  
(p-value, Wald test of =0) 
0.124  
(0.09)* 







Observations  149892 149892 149892 149892 149892 149892 
 
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 




Table 6: Market-level Poisson Regressions 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 




-0.235 -0.829 -1.335  -1.326 -0.849  -0.807  0.062 
(0.135)* (0.293)***  (0.491)*** (0.490)*** (0.295)***  (0.272)***  (0.590) 
Ln(fwd cites per pat 
in market) 
  -1.575 -0.348  -0.335  -1.785 -1.404 0.838 
 (0.708)**  (0.795)  (0.795)  (0.730)** (0.679)** (1.352) 
Ln(assignees per 
fwd cite in market) 
      -0.185    
      (0.109)*    
D(Regime)         0.787  1.659 
       (0.597)  (1.810) 
D(Regime) X 
ln(mkt’s patents) 
       -0.097  -0.319 
       (0.038)**  (0.108)*** 
D(Regime) X 
ln(fwd cites per pat) 
       -0.001  0.166 
       (0.159)  (0.450) 
Incumbents/100  0.733 0.709 -0.520  -0.519 0.727 0.826 1.492 
(0.166)*** (0.167)*** (0.274)*  (0.275)* (0.168)***  (0.172)***  (0.239)*** 
(Incumbents/100) 
squared 
-0.056 -0.055 0.040  0.039  -0.057 -0.067 -0.128 
(0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.038)  (0.038) (0.020)***  (0.020)***  (0.029)*** 
Growth  of  sales  0.531 0.518 0.425  0.424  0.522 0.535 0.746 
(0.110)*** (0.103)*** (0.069)***  (0.069)*** (0.109)***  (0.095)***  (0.259)*** 
CR4  2.947 2.794 -1.228  -1.220 2.930 3.167 4.759 
(1.753)* (1.719)  (2.185)  (2.186) (1.713)*  (1.682)*  (2.182)** 
CR4  squared  -3.572 -3.387 -0.093 -0.099  -3.554  -3.652  -4.109 
(1.619)** (1.565)** (2.025)  (2.025) (1.553)**  (1.559)**  (2.403)* 
Constant  1.041 9.237 -504.790  -246.513  10.027  8.869 -7.950 




























Observations 162 162 162  162  162 162 162 
Log  Likelihood  -415.67 -412.12 -434.52  -434.44  -411.31 -409.25 -211.43 
 
Robust standard errors (clustered by market) in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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711: memoryTable A.1: Summary Statistics on Entry, by SOF and year
  Number of  Market Participants  Number of Entrants 
SOF  1994  1996  1998 2000  2002  2004 1994  1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Artificial  intelligence  R&D  21  33  33  40  39  35  0  4 1 0 0 0 
Automatic  teller  machine  software  20  20  19  28  27  36  2  1 2 4 1 2 
Database query language software  47  72  108  117  120  146  5  18  39  14  5  17 
Desktop  publishing  software  34  45  47  64  55  60  4  3 7 7 1 7 
Disaster  recovery  software  20  31  51 59  70  90 6  8  15 5  3  10 
Electronic  message  systems  software  50  70  92 152  206  277  7  12 17 19 11 32 
Fax  software  24  68  91 114  116  110  12  21 19 8  8  8 
File  management  software  167  230  262  340  505  717  34  36 26 40 32 105 
Geographic information systems software  48  81  94  136  131  162  7  15  12  8  1  16 
Hierarchical  DBMS  software  20  32  34  42  47  61  2  8 5 4 0 5 
Internet  tools  0  41  234  504  728  741  0  25 94 97 38 88 
Inventory  management  software  442  549  557  651  661  692  27  53 39 28 16 48 
Invoicing/Billing  Software  400  452  458  526  551  541  21  33 29 23 11 36 
Local  area  network  (LAN)  software  16  45  58 88  84  117  7  14 11 14 5  10 
Natural  language  software  5  8  10  16  19  23  1  2 2 2 2 3 
Neural  network  software  5  11  16  27  24  19  0  4 5 3 0 0 
Order  entry/processing  software  290  336  375  470  501  507  27  36 42 26 14 42 
Performance  measuring  software  56  86  127  198  271  395  13  15 31 21 26 73 
Peripheral  device  drivers  41  50  58  98  108 117  5  5 9 17  1 8 
Quality  control  software  38  53  71 90  92  97 6  10 9  8  2  13 
Relational DBMS software  133  155  172  185  167  189  11  20  21  8  1  15 
Robotic  software  10  12  13  12  12  14  2  2 2 0 0 0 
Security/auditing  software  87  130  174  297  396  567  12  25 25 33 21 64 
Tax preparation and reporting software  99  111  107  124  122  132  5  7  10  4  0  13 
Three dimensional representation software  41  71  116  166  155  178  4  14  22  8  5  8 
Voice  technology  software  20  37  59  82  103 138  4  6 10  4 3 16 
Wide  area  network  software  102  131  134  159  142  176  22  22 15 14 2  6 
Mean  82.8  109.6  132.2  177.2  201.9  234.7  9.1  15.5 19.2 15.5 7.7  23.9 
Median  41  68  92 117  120  138  6  14 15 8  3  13 
Std.  Dev.  115.5  134.1  137.5  173.9  208.6  232.8  9.3  12.8 19.1 19.3 10.4 28.5  
Table A.2: Summary Statistics on Patents and Cited Assignees, by SOF and year 
  Number of  patents in force  Number of assignees cited in patents in force 
SOF  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  1994  1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Artificial  intelligence  R&D  567  821  1166  1297  1396  1565  160  198 362 254 439 355 
Automatic  teller  machine  software  305  332  392  529  676  818  58  163 259 352 348 454 
Database query language software  580  1032  1990  3366  5015  7083  155  395  828  1055  1526  2000 
Desktop  publishing  software  547  755  1096  1496  1827  2125  111  220 401 457 522 561 
Disaster  recovery  software  1744  2330  3245  4235  5220  6407  312  513 731 833 894 1154 
Electronic message systems software  15  27  62  154  317  481  16  27  99  170  419  439 
Fax  software  112  216  527  1284  2091  2960  88  219 521 836 1191  1438 
File  management  software  642  1080  2015  3286  4819  6500  158  383 760 874 1307  1677 
Geographic information systems software  3264  3911  4406  5460  7483  9237  408  535  620  767  1052  1160 
Hierarchical  DBMS  software  580  1032  1990 3366 5015 7083 155  395  828  1055  1526  2000 
Internet  tools  759  1283  2660  5141  7807  10729  308  628  1241 1651 2209 2738 
Inventory  management  software  276  321  426  599  807  1022  158  206 368 444 478 543 
Invoicing/Billing  Software  41  61  110  192  250  279  31  51  148 145 139 104 
Local area network (LAN) software  665  1133  2330  4408  6659  9151  259  545  1093  1443  1880  2428 
Natural  language  software  719  879  1151  1458  1738  1998  171  235 333 305 309 458 
Neural  network  software  358  542  785  866  930  1046  119  160 264 172 349 243 
Order  entry/processing  software  704  839  1234 2243 2839 3198 308  300  746  1117  1116  910 
Performance  measuring  software  4187  5284  6591  8048  9409  11083  446  659 800 910 924 1126 
Peripheral  device  drivers  2427 3158  4572 6333 7672 9459 425  658  904  1105  1004  1261 
Quality  control  software  26  37  52  77  109  193  17  17 59 65 79 170 
Relational DBMS software  580  1032  1990  3366  5015  7083  155  395  828  1055  1526  2000 
Robotic  software  309 339  362 372 525 629 103 99  130  86  271  231 
Security/auditing  software  270  389  695  1227  1618  2027  107  211 393 524 562 631 
Tax  preparation  and  reporting  software  10  10  12  19  23  26  15  15 16 21 16 6 
Three  dimensional  representation  software  1598  1840  2177  2577  3207  3898  324  388 570 521 703 866 
Voice  technology  software  1722  1971  2778  3669  4559  5134  233  336 655 560 711 795 
Wide  area  network  software  665  1133  2330  4408  6659  9151  259  545  1093 1443 1880 2428 
Mean  876.7  1177.3  1746.1  2573.2  3469.8  4458.0  187.4  314.7 557.4 674.8 865.9 1043.6 
Median  580  879  1234  2243  2839  3198  158  300 570 560 711 866 






Timing of regime changes in software patentability for markets in the sample 
Pre-1996 
ba_a  Automatic teller machine software 
ma_c Robotic  software 
ma_q  Quality control  software 
ut_h  Peripheral device drivers 
After 1996 
ai_a  Voice technology software 
ai_l  Natural language software 
ai_n  Neural network software 
cs_f Fax  software 
cs_i Internet  tools 
cs_l  Wide area network software 
cs_w  Local area network software 
dm_f File  management  software 
dm_mh Hierarchical  DBMS  software 
dm_mr  Relational DBMS software 
dm_q  Database query language software 
oa_gd  3D representation software 
oa_me  Electronic message systems software 
oa_p  Desktop publishing software 
sv_ar  Artificial intelligence R&D 
ts_er  Geographic information systems software  
ts_er  Geographic information systems software  
ut_r  Disaster recovery software 
ut_x Security/auditing  software 
ut_y  Performance measuring software 
After 1998 
ac_b Invoicing/Billing  Software 
ac_t  Tax preparation and reporting software 
wd_i  Inventory management software 
wd_o  Order entry/processing software 
 
 
 DATA DESCRIPTION 
SOF-Patent concordance 
This section describes the process used to develop a mapping between SOF categories 
and patents.  Our initial approach was to look at specialists -- firms that produced in only one of 
the aggregate categories (i.e.: AI: “Artificial Intelligence software”, DM “Database/file 
management software”, etc.).  We created a concordance based on the three most common 
USPTO primary classes associated with specialists in these fields.  However, this approach 
proved unsatisfactory for several reasons.   
First, the concordance is based on the patents of small, young firms with few patents.  
This creates potential for bias because the firms most actively engaged in patenting are the ones 
that have products in several areas.  By focusing on specialists, we may miss an important part of 
patenting in the sector.  Second, firms could be deterred from entering a market by the existence 
of patents held by firms that are not competitors in product markets but that hold key upstream 
patents and insist on costly licenses.  So focusing only on patents held by the firm’s direct 
competitors may also ignore important areas of the relevant intellectual property landscape.   
Finally, some of the aggregate classes contain sub-classes that are quite heterogeneous.  
For example, “MA - manufacturing software systems” contains sub-classes MA_C “robotic 
software”, MA_E “machine vision software”, MA_Q “quality control software”, and MA_F 
“factory data collection software”, all of which are fairly distinct from each other.  Focusing on 
the sub-classes makes it much easier to pick out a handful of class-subclass combinations that 
seem to map directly to the SOF category in question.  For example, subclasses 245-264 (Robot 
control) of class 700 (DATA PROCESSING: GENERIC CONTROL SYSTEMS OR SPECIFIC 
APPLICATIONS) seem to map directly into SOF category MA_C.  Similarly, subclasses 108-
115 (performance monitoring for product assembly or manufacturing) of class 700 seem closely 
related to category MA_Q.  Indeed, subclass 109 is called “quality control.” 
We identify the class-subclass combinations in the US Patent Classification that map into 
SOF sub-categories in the following way.  First, we search the abstracts of our set of software 
patents for the key words used to describe the sub-category in the CorpTech codebook.  We 
began by searching for the description of each SOF category in the patent abstracts.  Since some 
of the key words are more specific than others, this method will obviously work well for some 
sub-categories (i.e.: “voice recognition software”) and less well for others (i.e.: “operating 
systems”). 
Using these patents as a base, we then searched for words that co-occur with the key 
words.  We calculate the frequency with which these words are observed in the patents containing key words, and divide it by the frequency with which the words are observed in all software 
patents, to obtain how many more times the word is observed in key word-matching patents than 
in random patents.  We then examined the words in the top decile of this distribution, and 
selected the ones that were the best candidates for identifying relevant patents
i.  We then repeat 
the key word search including these words. 
Once we have a set of patents that contain key words or words extremely likely to co-
occur with key words, we looked at the citations made by these patents.  We selected the most 
often-cited classes and subclasses, and then examined the PTO’s description of these classes.  
After a careful reading of the classification manual, we selected the classes that are both highly 
prevalent in the word-matching patents and clearly related to the sub-category in question.  It is 
important to note that, because software is an area in which many of the patents have been re-
classified following their grant dates, we also had to look up the current classifications of these 
patents.  To do this, we used a script that downloads patents and their current classification from 
the USPTO website. 
Table A1 lists the SOF-patent class concordance we obtained using this methodology.  
The concordance is currently restricted to 27 SOF categories.   
 






Most commonly cited USPTO class  Subclasses and other 
class/subclass combinations 
used in mapping 
ac_b Invoicing/Billing 
Software 
705 (DATA PROCESSING: 
FINANCIAL, BUSINESS PRACTICE, 
MANAGEMENT, OR COST/PRICE 
DETERMINATION) 
34 (Accounting/Bill Preparation), 
40 (Finance/../Bill distribution or 
payment), 64-69 (Secure 
transaction) 
ac_t Tax  preparation 
and reporting 
software 
705 (DATA PROCESSING: 
FINANCIAL, BUSINESS PRACTICE, 
MANAGEMENT, OR COST/PRICE 
DETERMINATION) 
019 (Tax processing) and 031 
(Tax preparation or submission) ai_a Voice 
technology 
software 
704 (DATA PROCESSING: SPEECH 
SIGNAL PROCESSING, 
LINGUISTICS, LANGUAGE 
TRANSLATION, AND AUDIO 
COMPRESSION/DECOMPRESSION)
All subclasses up to 278 are 
represented. 
ai_l Natural  language 
software 
704 (DATA PROCESSING: SPEECH 
SIGNAL PROCESSING, 
LINGUISTICS, LANGUAGE 
TRANSLATION, AND AUDIO 
COMPRESSION/DECOMPRESSION)
subclasses 8 and 9 (Multilingual 
or national language support; 
Natural language) Also class 382 
ai_n Neural  network 
software 
706 (DATA PROCESSING: 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE) 
15-45 (Neural Networks) 
ba_a Automatic  teller 
machine 
software 
235 (REGISTERS)  378 -380  (Banking systems and 
Credit or identification card 
systems ); 705/41-43 
(AUTOMATED ELECTRICAL 




238 (article handling/dispensing 
or vending) 
cs_f  Fax software  709  (ELECTRICAL COMPUTERS 
AND DIGITAL PROCESSING 
SYSTEMS: MULTICOMPUTER 
DATA TRANSFERRING) 
201-206 (DISTRIBUTED DATA 
PROCESSING  and 
COMPUTER 
CONFERENCING) and 217-219 
(REMOTE DATA 
ACCESSING)  
cs_i  Internet tools  709  (ELECTRICAL COMPUTERS 
AND DIGITAL PROCESSING 
SYSTEMS: MULTICOMPUTER 
DATA TRANSFERRING) 
all 2XX subclasses (deals with 
computers talking to each other) 
also 705, subclasses 026 
(Electronic shopping (e.g., 
remote ordering) and 705/014(Distribution or 
redemption of coupon, or 
incentive or promotion program); 
and 707/10 (Database or file 
accessing, distributed or remote 
access) 
cs_l Local  area 
network (LAN) 
software 
709  (ELECTRICAL COMPUTERS 
AND DIGITAL PROCESSING 
SYSTEMS: MULTICOMPUTER 
DATA TRANSFERRING) 
all 2XX subclasses 
cs_w Wide  area 
network (WAN) 
software 
709  (ELECTRICAL COMPUTERS 
AND DIGITAL PROCESSING 
SYSTEMS: MULTICOMPUTER 
DATA TRANSFERRING) 





DATABASE AND FILE 
MANAGEMENT OR DATA 
STRUCTURES) 
sub 1-10 (DATABASE OR FILE 
ACCESSING) and 200-206 





DATABASE AND FILE 
MANAGEMENT OR DATA 
STRUCTURES) 
sub 1-10 (DATABASE OR FILE 
ACCESSING ) and 100-104.1 
(DATABASE SCHEMA OR 




DATABASE AND FILE 
MANAGEMENT OR DATA 
STRUCTURES) 
sub 1-10 (DATABASE OR FILE 
ACCESSING ) and 100-104.1 
(DATABASE SCHEMA OR 
DATA STRUCTURE ) 




DATABASE AND FILE 
MANAGEMENT OR DATA 
STRUCTURES) 
sub 1-10 (DATABASE OR FILE 
ACCESSING ) esp 002-006 
(Query processing (i.e., 
searching)) and 100-104.1 
(DATABASE SCHEMA OR 
DATA STRUCTURE ) ma_c  Robotic software  700 (DATA PROCESSING: 
GENERIC CONTROL SYSTEMS OR 
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS) 
sub 245-264 (Robot control) 
ma_q Quality  control 
software 
700 (DATA PROCESSING: 







class 345 (COMPUTER GRAPHICS 
PROCESSING AND SELECTIVE 
VISUAL DISPLAY SYSTEMS) 
418-427 (Three-dimension) and 
700/98 ( 3-D product design 




709 (ELECTRICAL COMPUTERS 
AND DIGITAL PROCESSING 
SYSTEMS: MULTICOMPUTER 
DATA TRANSFERRING) 






715 (DATA PROCESSING: 
PRESENTATION PROCESSING OF 
DOCUMENT, OPERATOR 
INTERFACE PROCESSING, AND 








706 (DATA PROCESSING: 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE) 




701 (DATA PROCESSING: 
VEHICLES, NAVIGATION, AND 
RELATIVE LOCATION) 
2xxx (NAVIGATION); 702/005 




710 (ELECTRICAL COMPUTERS 
AND DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING 
SYSTEMS: INPUT/OUTPUT) 
 classes 1-74 (INPUT/OUTPUT 
DATA PROCESSING) esp sub 
008-019 (Peripheral 
configuration/peripheral 






sub 1-57 (DATA PROCESSING 
SYSTEM ERROR OR FAULT 
HANDLING) esp 006 
(Redundant stored data accessed 
(e.g., duplicated data, error 
correction coded data, or other 
parity-type data)), also class 
707(DATA PROCESSING: 
DATABASE AND FILE 
MANAGEMENT OR DATA 
STRUCTURES) 200-206(FILE 
OR DATABASE 




726 (Information Security) all 
subclasses 


















705 (DATA PROCESSING: 
FINANCIAL, BUSINESS PRACTICE, 
MANAGEMENT, OR COST/PRICE 
DETERMINATION) 
esp sub 28 (Inventory 
management) and 10 (Market 





705 (DATA PROCESSING: 
FINANCIAL, BUSINESS PRACTICE, 
MANAGEMENT, OR COST/PRICE 
DETERMINATION) 
esp sub 1-45(AUTOMATED 
ELECTRICAL FINANCIAL OR 
BUSINESS PRACTICE OR 
MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT) including 26 
(Electronic shopping (e.g., 
remote ordering))  
 
How accurate and comprehensive is this concordance? Obviously, we need to balance 
type I errors associated with a too-narrow definition of the relevant set of patents against type II 
errors from a too-inclusive definition.  We attempt to answer this question by determining what 
share of patents held by firms specializing in a category are picked up by the patent classes 
assigned to that category, and how many of the patents in those classes are assigned to specialist 
firms in the CorpTech database that do not operate in the category in question.  A preliminary 
analysis of a selection of SOF codes well populated by specialist patents is found in Table A.5.
ii  Table A.5: Validation of SOF-patent concordance for a selected set of SOF codes, using 












Billing/Invoicing software  9 4 0.444  0.571
Neural Network software  5 4 0.800  0.364
ATM software  14 10 0.786  1.000
Internet tools  62 17 0.274  0.218
WAN software  173 5 0.029  0.076
File maintenance software  26 4 0.154  0.053
Relational DMBS software  223 103 0.462  0.715
Quality Control software  7 0 0.000  0.000
Three-dimensional imaging software  45 5 0.111  0.417
Electronic message systems software  11 1 0.091  0.500
Geographical Information Systems software 25 9 0.360  0.474
Peripheral device drivers  117 41 0.350  0.410
Disaster recovery software  11 7 0.636  0.079
Security/auditing software  108 22 0.204  0.815
Performance measuring software  8 2 0.250  0.044
 
Sensitivity = share of specialist pats identified. 
Positive predictive value = share of patents identified by mapping as belonging to that SOF that 
actually belong to a specialist in that SOF. 
 
 
Because surely not all patents held by specialists are for technologies related to the firm’s 
main product, we have also read the patents held by specialists to estimate how many such 
patents we should expect our concordance to (correctly) miss.  We read the abstracts of all the 
specialist patents in a handful of categories, chosen because they are both narrowly-defined and 
populated by a significant number of specialist patents.  These categories are invoicing/billing, automatic teller machines, geographic information systems, three-dimensional representation, and 
security/auditing.  We found that a significant fraction of patents held by firms specializing in 
these fields were not strictly speaking covering technologies in the field.  Table A3 lists the share 
of patents held by specialists in a SOF category that actually relate to technologies in that 
category. 
As an example, consider the patents held by firms specializing in automatic teller 
machine software.  A number of these patents are for software used to track and dispense medical 
items (5,912,818, 5,971,593, and 5,993,046).  Others are for digital cash systems like smart cards 
(6,032,135).  Others are simply not software patents (6,042,003: “lighting system for automated 
banking machine”), despite the fact that they are classified in IPC G06F. 
Table A.6: Specialist Patents 
 
SOF  Number of specialist 
patents read 
Share of specialist 
patents in SOF 
invoicing/billing 10  60% 
automatic teller machines  13  46% 
geographic information systems  45  85% 
three-dimensional representation  20  20% 
security/auditing 26  65% 
 
As a result, we should not necessarily expect our SOF-patent mapping to pick up all 
specialist patents, and the sensitivity of the mapping should be evaluated with this fact in mind.  
These findings, based admittedly on a small sample of SOFs, might suggest a rule of thumb like 
the following: if at least 50% of the patents held by specialists in a given area are picked up, the 
mapping can be considered successful.   
 
Selectivity 
Nothing about the 27 SOF classes for which we have established a patent concordance 
strikes us as being a source of serious selection bias.  As noted in the main body of the paper, 
firms active in these markets tend to have more patents than firms in the markets we omit, but we 
feel this is an inevitable fact arising from the way the SOF categories are defined.  Firms in 
sampled markets have on average sales of $50 million
iii and an age of 14.89 years.  Firms in other 
markets have on average sales of $44 million, and an age of 14.53 years.  The average entry rate 
of markets in the sample is 0.21, and the average exit rate is 0.12.  Markets excluded from the sample have an average entry rate of 0.16 and an exit rate of 0.14 (the difference in exit rates is 
statistically insignificant), The high entry rate of the sample comes from the fact that it includes 
internet-related markets.  When these are excluded, the average entry rate is 0.17, which is 






                                                 
i This step is necessary to weed out idiosyncratic and misspelled words. 
ii We exclude patents held by firms that specialize in one SOF code, but that have a primary two-digit SIC 
code other than 73. We do this because these firms are not true specialists – they just appear as specialists 
in the Corptech dataset, which is restricted to software. These firms are likely to have patents in fields other 
than the software market in which they are active, and thus their patent portfolios are not a good indicator 
of state of the art in that particular software market. 
iii This calculation is based on a weighted average of the categorical revenue measures at the mid-point of 
the range. Because 23% of the observations in our CorpTech dataset have missing revenue data, this 
number may be inflated if the missing values tend to be firms with lower revenues. 